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Abstract:  The prospects of UK shale gas development and its role in the energy mix has generated 
contradictory views. Its inclusion in electricity generation is anticipated to help mitigate the grid 
FDUERQ HPLVVLRQV +RZHYHU WKHUH LV IHDU WKDW D VKDOH JDV µUHYROXWLRQ¶ PLJKW GLVWUDct policy 
commitments on the development of low carbon technologies. Others argue that a shale gas 
µERRP¶FRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\FUHDWHDµORFN-in-HIIHFW¶RQJDVJHQHUDWLRQLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVWKXVIXUWKHU
exacerbating the burden on carbon emissions.  The uncertainty over the future role of shale gas 
is worsened by lack of clarity and conflicting estimates on the potential gas resource and 
reserves. In the midst of these uncertainties, this paper seeks to examine transition pathways 
incorporating shale gas and their implications on electricity sector decarbonisation and energy 
security objectives 
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Introduction 
he SURVSHFW RI D SRWHQWLDO µERRP¶ LQ shale gas development is set to transform the UK 
power sector and the energy policy landscape. Developments in shale gas have come at a 
time when the UK is working towards the 80% greenhouse gas emission (GHG) reduction 
target by 2050 against the 1990 levels (HM Government 2008). Since the power sector accounts 
for 27% of the total emission (Department of Energy & Climate Change 2011a), the Committee 
on Climate Change (CCC) proposes that the sector should reduce its grid emission intensity from 
about 500gCO2/kWh to 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 and almost zero in 2050 (Committee on Climate 
Change 2010). In order to mRQLWRU WKH QDWLRQ¶V SURJUHVV WRZDUGV WKH  HPLVVLRQ UHGXFWLRQ
target by 2050, the Climate Change Act enacted a system of Carbon Budgets which set a 50% 
emission target to be achieved by 2025, the mid-point of the fourth (2023-27) carbon budget 
(Committee on Climate Change 2010). In fact, the climate change policies seek to put a 
constraint on the increased use of unabated fossil fuels in electricity generation. Currently, the 
electricity generating capacity is being undermined by the European Union (EU) environmental 
pollution regulations in the form of Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) and the Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IED). These policies are set to accelerate the closure of coal plants by 2015 
and 2023, respectively, (Committee on Climate Change 2013a). Electricity generating capacity is 
set to dwindle further due the anticipated retirement by 2023 of the current nuclear fleet which is 
reaching the end of its operational life. These developments will lead to the loss of almost 20GW 
of the existing generating capacity, thus, threatening our security of supply over the next decade 
(Department of Energy & Climate Change 2011a). In order to replace this capacity gap and 
T 
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prepare for the electricity sector decarbonisation by 2030, the government estimates that 40-
70GW capacity of low-carbon electricity generation needs to be built through the 2020s (HM 
Government 2011).   
The low-carbon technology penetration anticipated in the 2020s could potentially coincide 
with the large scale production of shale gas expected in the early 2020s (House of Lords 2014). 
However, the timeline for shale gas production is still uncertain as its development is still in 
infancy. Nonetheless, the role of unconventional gas in a carbon constrained future generation 
mix is debatable. It is envisaged that domestic production of shale gas could contribute to 
physical security of gas supplies by reducing import dependency (UKERC 2013). The increased 
use of shale gas in the US is widely believed to have contributed to about 430 million tonnes 
(7.7%) fall in carbon emissions since 2006 (AEA 2012). This has been attributed by the switch 
from coal to gas in electricity generation. As a result, demand for coal plummeted in the US 
leading to increased exports of coal around the globe, thus increasing carbon emissions outside 
the US (AEA 2012). 
Analysis done by the IEA suggests that GHG emissions from shale gas electricity generation 
are about 2% to 10% lower than conventional pipeline gas outside of Europe (AEA 2012). The 
emission intensity of shale gas use in electricity generation is estimated to range from 423-
535gCO2/kWh, which is significantly lower than the carbon footprint of coal, 837-
1130gCO2/kWh (Department of Energy & Climate Change 2013). Despite its lower carbon 
footprint compared to coal, the use of shale gas in electricity generation has limited abatement 
benefits unless used in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) applications (UKERC 2013). This 
implies that the use of significant amounts of unabated shale gas in the UK electricity generation 
mix in the 2020s and beyond could make it very difficult to comply with the legally binding 
carbon budgets (Ekins et al. 2013). The use of shale gas in electricity generation could have a 
short-term impact in reducing GHG emissions but increased government appetite towards this 
resource has a potential to reduce investment in research, development and deployment of low 
carbon technologies (Schrag 2012).   
It is still uncertain whether a combination of both domestic production and increased imports 
of shale gas could result in the fall in gas prices in the UK. Forecasts indicate that global gas 
prices will go up by 55% by 2035 (IEA 2011), but the Energy and Climate Change Committee 
(ECCC) believe that an increase in unconventional gas production is likely to increase the chance 
of falling gas prices in the UK (Energy and Climate Change Committee 2011). The International 
Energy Agency (IEA 2011) believes that the spread of the American experience in 
unconventional gas production across the globe could reduce the cost of production, thus leading 
to a decline in average prices. In the event of a decline in unconventional gas prices, its 
contribution to addressing energy±related challenges could be overshadowed by the potential 
negative impacts it is believed to have on the environment. The sustainability of shale gas is a 
contentious issue which has polarized opinions across global communities. This articles 
contributes to this debate by employing WKH µ(nergy Optimization Calculator¶ to examine the 
potential emissions, technology development and investment challenges of shale gas use in the 
UK electricity generation mix and the policy implications on the 2030 and 2050 decarbonisation 
milestones.  
   
Shale Gas Resource Estimates: Developments so far 
The 6KDOHJDVµUHYROXWLRQ¶LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHKDVKDGULSSOHHIIHFWVDFURVVWKHJOREH7KHUDSLG
shale gas development in the US, which accounts for about 60% of production (IEA 2011), has 
significantly heightened speculation over its potential to transform energy markets in other parts 
of the world. However, the experience in America is not likely to be replicated in other countries 
due to the regional variations in the petro-physical properties of the shale rock formations, 
national policy strategies, cost and social acceptance (Ernst & Young 2012). It is also feared that 
access to land could be difficult due to concerns over population densities and the need for, and 
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treatment of, large volumes of water especially in agricultural areas (IEA 2011). Increasing 
concern over the potential impact of hydraulic fracturing on the environment has prompted some 
countries in Europe to impose bans on shale gas developments. However, fierce public 
opposition to unconventional gas development in UK has so far failed to change the 
SROLF\PDNHUV¶HQWKXVLDVPDnd focus towards this resource. Instead, the government is working 
towards strengthening and extending the existing and well established legal framework 
regulating the UK oil and gas industry to shale gas to ensure the effective mitigation and 
management of potential environmental and safety risks.   
The Global Shale Gas Resource prospects 
Globally, the TRR of shale gas is likely to be about 7,201tcf, with the largest resource in China, 
Argentina and Algeria contributing 1,115, 802 and 707tcf, respectively (EIA 2013). The 
distribution of the global TRR shale gas potential is shown in (Fig.1), representing 10 countries 
with the highest Shale gas potential and 5 in Europe. Shale gas development in Europe is not 
expected until after 2020, as time is needed for resource appraisal, development and associated 
technical, environmental and regulatory issues (IEA 2011). According to the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA 2013) (XURSH¶V 755 LV HVWLPDWHG WR EH XS WR tcf, with Poland and 
France recording the highest estimates of 148tcf and 137tcf, respectively. In contrast, (Pearson et 
al. 2012) estimated the European TRR to range from 81.2 to 621tcf with a mean of 250tcf. 
The future potential for shale gas resource development is subject to multiple physical, technical, 
economic and political uncertainties, including the size and recoverability of the physical 
resource (McGlade et al. 2013). As a result, estimates of the TRR for shale gas resources are 
bound to be revised upward and downward over time as new information is made available. 
Despite the great uncertainty over the timetable and economic recoverability of these resources, 
the potential large scale exploitation of these resources (Fig.1) could have huge impacts on the 
global gas markets. Such a development could impact greatly on the UK electricity sector 
expected to be predominantly low-carbon by 2030. 
  
 
Figure 1: Recoverable shale gas resource (top 10 + Europe) 
Source: (EIA 2013) 
 
UK Shale Gas resource potential 
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The current UK shale gas resource studies have been focused on large parts of central Britain 
covering the Bowland-Hodder unit which extends from Merseyside to Humberside and 
Loughborough to Pickering (Andrews 2013). Production potential has also been expressed in 
Jurassic formations of the Weald and Wessex basins of southern England and the Midland Valley 
of Scotland as shown in (Fig.2). The central resource estimate or the Gas in Place (GIP) for the 
Bowland Hodder unit is believed to be around 1329 trillion cubic feet (tcf) (Andrews 2013). The 
Midland Valley of 6FRWODQG¶VFHQWUDOHVWLPDWHLVEHOLHYHGWREHURXJKO\WFI7KHVHWZRNH\
area studies indicate a total resource base estimate of about 1409.3tcf of shale gas in the UK 
(Monaghan 2014). Based on the 10% recovery rate applied on conventional oil and gas fields, the 
central estimate could provide 140.9tcf of recoverable shale gas (McAlinden 2013). This 
resource estimate is almost 50 times the UK annual domestic and industrial gas consumption of 
2.8tcf (McAlinden 2013). In view of the total in-place gas resource estimate for the UK, the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA 2013) HVWLPDWHV WKH 8.¶V WHFKQLFDO UHFRYHUDEOH
resources (TRR) to be about 26tcf. 
Equally important is the reserve estimate; a speculative measure describing the amount of 
gas that might be extracted given the appropriate technology, economics and other factors 
(Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology 2011). Currently, no reliable estimate of gas 
reserves exist in the UK as this is dependent on increased exploration. In 2013, the UK electricity 
sector used about 18,500 million cubic meters (0.76tcf) of gas for electricity generation 
(Department of Eenergy & Climate Change 2014), thus it is imperative that sufficient 
information on reserves is developed in order to measure the potential role of shale gas in 
electricity generation.  
  
 
Figure 2: Prospective areas with shale gas potential in the UK 
Source: (Monaghan 2014) 
Methodology 
The Energy Optimisation Calculator; developing energy pathways  
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Developing a sustainable pathway to a low carbon electricity supply system requires radical 
changes to technologies, institutions and business strategies, (Foxon et al. 2010). The impacts of 
these elements have been employed in the µEnergy Optimisation Calculator¶ to frame electricity 
generation pathways that incorporate shale gas use in the generation mix. The µEnergy 
Optimisation Calculator¶ is an in-house excel based tool used to develop electricity generation 
scenarios for which input variables are determined based on the current UK energy policy 
GHYHORSPHQWV7KHPRGHOGRHVQ¶W deal with time, instead, multiple runs are done manually for 
each five year period and data is carried on to the next run. The model calculator uses a baseline 
scenario with 16 specified generation technologies, emission target (185.8MtCO2e) and energy 
demand (379.2TWh) data based on the 2007 energy policies. Based on the baseline scenario, 
three key scenarios are developed namely; Sustainable50 which adopts a 50gCO2/kWh target 
using conventional gas in the mix, and the two shale gas scenarios; Shale Gas50 and Shale 
Gas100 representing pathways which aim to achieve 50gCO2/kWh and 100gCO2/kWh by 2030 
using shale gas, respectively.  
The installed capacity distribution and generation profile reflected in these transition 
pathways is shaped by the following model assumptions: 
1. Adoption of a decarbonisation target of 50 and 100gCO2/kWh by 2030.  
2. Emission grid intensity is close to zero by 2050.  
3. Integrating abundant supplies of domestic produced shale gas in electricity generation 
by 2030 with a 30% fuel price reduction margin.  
4. Shale gas emission intensity in electricity generation is 423gCO2/kWh.  
5. Commercial deployment of CCS begins in 2025.  
6. No unabated coal generation post 2025 
7. Unabated gas generation reserved for system balancing.   
Table 1.1 shows the medium technology cost data input computed in the µEnergy 
Optimisation Calculator¶ to develop scenarios to explore the role of shale gas on the UK 
electricity generation sector. An annual inflation rate from 2010 to 2013 has been used to update 
the cost input date to 2013 level. The emission constraint applied to develop the three transitions 
is shown in Table 1.2. %H\RQG  WKH HPLVVLRQ WUDMHFWRU\ IRU WKH ³SDWK WR J´ is lineally 
interpolated to 2050 where the sector achieves a near zero emission intensity, while the emission 
WUHQGIRUWKH³SDWKWRJ´VKRZV an annual emission decline of about 0.45MtCO2e based on the 
2020-2030 emission projection (Committee on Climate Change 2013a).  
  
Table 1.1: Medium technology cost data input 
  
Electricity generation Technologies 
 
Capital cost 
(£/kW) 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
(£/MWy) 
 
Data source 
Wind Onshore (Nth of a kind) 1,596 75,396  
Wind Offshore (Nth of a kind) 2,851 181,773  
Renewable (Biomass) CHP 4,272 222,371 (Department of Energy 
& Climate Change 
2011b) 
Hydroelectricity 2,417 88,462  
Biomass 2,532 152,289  
Pumped Storage 1,958 12,570 (Parsons Brinckerhoff 
2011) 
Nuclear (1st of a kind) 4,428 94,688  
Biomass with CCS 4,118 131,092  
Gas CCGT (Nth of a kind)    599   22,655 (Parsons Brinckerhoff 
2012) 
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Gas CCGT-CCS (1st of a kind) 1,369   39,674  
Conventional CCGT CHP    618   47,214  
Coal (Pulverized Fuel, ASC -  FGD) 1,954  60,602  
Coal CCS (Pulverized fuel, ASC, 
FGD-CCS) 
3,354 120,383 (Mott MacDonald 
2010) 
Wave 3,610 200,000  
Tidal 2,750   37,200 (Department of Energy 
& Climate Change 
2011c) 
Solar PV (New built 250-5000kW)    780   20,400 (Department of Energy 
& Climate Change 
2012a) 
 
 
 
Table 1.2: Emission target for pathways (MtCO2e) 
Scenarios 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Path to 50g 157 131.4 63.5 26.9 20.7 10 5 3 2.6 
Path to 100g 157 131.4 63.5 43.9 41.2 39.3 36.9 34.7 32.5 
Source;(Committee on Climate Change 2013b)- 2010 to 2030 emission projection 
  
 The model depicts the electricity generation transition in five year intervals from 2010 to 
2050. The capital investment used to evaluate the power generation mix is amortised over the 
³WHFKQLFDO OLIH  \HDUV´ XVLQJ D GLVFRXQW UDWH Other input variables used in the model 
include a physical installation limit (GW) for each technology, which gives the estimated total 
deployment capacity in line with industry and government ambitions. The model approach sets 
an installation constraint which allows the maximum feasible capacity to be added in the 
generation mix at any given time, taking into account the technical, economic, environmental and 
social factors that impact on technology penetration. This sets the maximum capacity limit for 
each technology that the model can add to the generation mix to meet the set demand and 
emission targets. 
The Optimisation Function of the Calculator 
The optimisation process aims to develop a least cost generation mix that meets electricity 
demand at lower grid carbon intensities (Fig.3) and carbon emissions (Table 1.2) in Shale Gas50, 
Shale Gas100 and Sustainable50 scenarios. Optimisation starts with the generation technologies 
set in the Baseline Scenario shown in Fig.4 and is modified after every run to generate the three 
scenarios based on the input variables chosen. When the optimised generation portfolio in each 
model run fails to meet electricity demand, the model adds the least-cost technologies to the mix. 
Conversely, if demand is lower, the model removes the most expensive technologies in the mix 
until the demand is met.  
The next stage in the optimisation process assesses the capacity of the assembled generation 
mix to meet the emission target. If the emissions are met the process ends but if not, optimisation 
ZLOO FRQWLQXH $W WKLV VWDJH WKH PRGHO µVZDSV RXW¶ KLJK FDUERQ LQWHQVLYH WHFKQRORJLHV IRU ORZ
carbon technologies until the carbon target is just met as depicted in Fig.4. During the 
optimisation procedure, the model keeps track of the cost of electricity accrued in developing the 
cheapest technology mix that lowers the average carbon emissions. Once the optimization 
process is completed, the output module would then show the proportion of capacity (GW) 
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required to meet the demand from the assembled technologies and the corresponding electricity 
generation achieved in TWh/yr.  
  
 
Figure 3: Electricity demand and emission intensity 
Source: (Department of Energy & Climate Change 2010) 
  
 
Figure 4: Main components and process flow of the 'Energy Optimisation Calculator' 
 
Cost of Energy  
The cost of electricity (COE) generation methodology is used as a ranking tool to assess the cost-
effectiveness of different energy generating technologies, (Short et al. 1995). In order to 
determine the investment options available across different technologies, the approach used in 
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this article considers the lifetime generated energy and costs to determine the price of electricity 
per unit energy generated.  
Through this energy cost estimate, the model captures investment costs, operation and 
maintenance cost and fuel expenditures over the entire lifetime of the plant. Within the COE 
analysis, the stream of future costs and generation output are discounted by 10% to the present 
value. This assessment takes into account the likely impact of the sensitivity on construction 
costs, fuel costs and discount rates. The model formula used to calculate the COE is given as;  
  ܥܱܧ ൌ ܫ൤ ሺͳ ൅ ݎሻ௡ݎሺͳ ൅ ݎሻ௡൨ כ ܧ ൅ ܱܶܯܧ  
  
where I is the capital investment (cost per kW multiplied by the total installed capacity), r is the 
discount rate at 10%, E is the annual electricity generation (TWh), n is the lifetime of the plant, 
TOM is the total operation and maintenance costs. 
  
Results and Discussions  
Shale gas and the transition pathways  
The Committee on Climate Change believes that any path to an 80% reduction by 2050 requires 
that the electricity generation is almost entirely decarbonized by 2030. Therefore, the µSDWK WR
J¶ decarbonisation framework seeks to reduce the carbon grid intensity from the current 
500g/kWh to 50g/kWh by 2030 (Committee on Climate Change 2010). Decarbonising the 
electricity sector is viewed as the most effective way of rapidly reducing emissions as it reduces 
pressure on other sectors of the economy to decarbonise. On the other hand, the µSDWKWRJ¶ 
decarbonisation WDUJHWLVSHUFHLYHGE\JRYHUQPHQWDVµ3ODQ%¶, likely to be adopted if low-carbon 
technology costs fall less quickly than anticipated or achievable build rates are lower than 
expected (Committee on Climate Change 2013a). Developments in shale gas and its benefits to 
the electricity sector are interpreted in the context of these two deep decarbonisation frameworks.  
Due to the 50gCO2/kWh emission constraint, the Sustainable50 scenario has 96.1GW 
renewable energy capacity, which is 61.2% of total capacity compared to the Shale Gas50 
scenario with 93.9GW renewable penetration accounting for 61% of total capacity by 2030. Low 
carbon technology penetration, mainly CCS and nuclear has a total of 17.4GW and 17GW 
capacity on the system, which is 11.1% and 11% of total installed capacity for Sustainable50 and 
Shale Gas50, respectively. Unabated gas capacity in Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 amounts to 
40.5GW, which is 25.8% and 26% of total capacity as illustrated in Fig.5 and Fig.6, respectively. 
Conversely, Shale Gas100 has 74.7GW renewable energy capacity which accounts for 57% of 
total capacity. Unabated gas capacity and low carbon installed capacity reaches 41GW and 
15.7GW by 2030, respectively (see Fig.7). Under the decarbonisation framework, unabated shale 
gas use is limited, hence its impacts on low-carbon and renewable energy penetration is quite 
minimal as shown by the results.  
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Figure 5: Installed generation capacity - Sustainable50 
 
 
Figure 6: Installed generation capacity - Shale Gas50 
 
 
Figure 7: Installed generation capacity - Shale Gas100 
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Figure 8 illustrates the impact of the using conventional and shale gas on the overall installed 
capacities for three energy pathways from 2030 to 2050. Under the decarbonisation frameworks, 
the results indicate that total installed capacity remains high in Sustainable50 compared to the 
Shale Gas50 and Shale Gas100 from 2030-2050. This is due to the higher emission intensity 
(488gCO2/kWh) of conventional gas (Parliamentary Office of Science & Technology 2011) 
applied compared to the 423gCO2/kWh for shale gas (Department of Energy & Climate Change 
2013). This results in more low-carbon technologies being deployed to compensate for low 
generation from emission intensive unabated conventional gas. According to the (AEA 2012), 
the shale gas emission factor is believed to be 2% to 10% lower than liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
imported from outside Europe. Therefore, this explains the increase in unabated generation in the 
two shale gas scenarios which curtails the low-carbon technology penetration comparative to the 
Sustainable50 pathway (Fig.8). The total installed capacity in Shale Gas100 is 17.4GW and 
9.9GW lower than in the Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 scenarios by 2050, respectively. This 
suggests that the 100gCO2/kWh emission intensity trajectory by 2030 allows for more gas 
generation at the expense of low carbon technologies, hence the lower overall installed capacity 
compared to pathways with deep emission targets.  
 
 
Figure 8: Impact of shale gas on overall installed generation capacities - 2030 to 2050 
The UK electricity demand is anticipated to increase by at least 30% to 100% by 2050 due to 
the electrification of heating and transportation (Department of Energy & Climate Change 
2012b). High penetration of renewables through the 2020s will relegate unabated gas generation 
to a system peaking role (AEA 2012) by 2030 as the electricity generation base load is 
dominated by nuclear, biomass and fossil fuels with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). The 
transition to a low carbon electricity system in Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 show 218TWh 
and 230TWh of total energy demand supplied from renewables, respectively. Low-carbon 
technologies contribute 137TWh and 135TWh to the total energy demand in 2030 in the two 
low-carbon pathways. This is consistent with WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V HVWLPDWHG -70GW new low-
carbon capacity deployment target required to decarbonise the electricity sector by 2030 (HM 
Government 2011). This is illustrated in Fig.9 and Fig.10 where unabated gas generation in 
Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 is limited to 9% and 10% of total generation in 2030 despite the 
25.8 % and 26% installed capacity shown in (Fig.5 and Fig.6). This generation trend from 
unabated gas is inevitable as Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) plants are anticipated to run 
at extremely low load factors, roughly below the 20% margin (Committee on Climate Change 
2013a) as the sector decarbonises.  
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 However, there are fears that large capacities of under-utilized CCGT plants could hinder 
IXWXUHDWWHPSWVWRGHFDUERQLVHWKHSRZHUVHFWRULQWKH8.GXHWRµLQYHVWPHQWORFN-LQ¶DSSOied to 
CCGT (Chignell and Gross 2013). Huge investment in shale gas development and new CCGT 
plants could potentially lock the UK into years of shale gas use, thereby creating a major 
distraction from transitioning to a genuine zero-carbon grid (Broderick et al. 2011). From an 
LQYHVWRU¶V perspective, the business case for retaining a large fleet of under-performing gas plants 
on the system could be hard to justify. Thus, the government would have to offer capital 
incentives to utility operators in order to keep their plants on stand-by to foster both system 
reliability and security of electricity supply.    
  
  
 
Figure 9: Electricity generation - Sustainable50 
  
  
 
Figure 10: Electricity generation - Shale Gas50 
Comparatively, the high emission trajectory target for Shale Gas100 scenario results in 
CCGT electricity generation totaling 21% (88.4TWh) of total electricity demand, while 
renewables and low-carbon generation only contribute 45% and 29% (187.6 TWh, 117.7TWh), 
respectively. The electricity generation profile for unabated fossil fuel highlighted in Fig.11 
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results in carbon emission intensity of about 61.2g/kWh as the gas plants run at high load factors, 
about 48% by 2050. This is due to the low emission factor for shale gas (423gCO2/kWh) coupled 
with the 30% fuel price reduction, thus making shale gas generation a favourable option in this 
scenario. Increased electricity generation from gas reduces the output from renewable and low-
carbon technologies, hence the high level of carbon emission intensity through the transition 
period compared to the Shale Gas50 and Sustainable50 (Fig.3).  
  
 
Figure 11: Electricity generation - Shale Gas100 
Electricity generation trends for unabated gas and gas with CCS shown in Fig.12 highlight 
the impact of different emission constraints and the introduction of lower emission shale gas in 
the mix. For all the three scenarios, the generation trend is similar up to 2020 due to the emission 
trajectory outlined in Table 1.2. After 2020, Shale Gas50 and Sustainable50 continue to decline 
at an identical rate until 2025. From 2030 through to 2050, the Sustainable50 unabated gas 
generation profile exhibits a steeper decline compared to the Shale Gas50 due to its higher 
emission factor which is judged to be 2% to 10% higher than that of shale gas . Thus, generation 
from lower emission alternatives are opted for at the expense of unabated gas generation to 
achieve the emission targets. In contrast, the Shale Gas100 generation profile declines slightly by 
2025 and increases in 2030 and remains relatively high until 2050 in line with the higher 
emission target. The generation pattern is reversed with regards to gas with CCS applications. 
CCS gas generation trend in Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 is almost identical, with total 
generation slightly higher than that of Shale Gas100. This is due to deeper decarbonisation 
required in the two scenarios while increased generation from unabated shale gas in Shale 
Gas100 curtails generation from shale gas with CCS.  
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Figure 12: Comparative gas electricity generation - unabated and CCS 
A scenario based study by (Jacoby et al. 2012) warned that a VKDOHJDV³UHYROXWLRQ´FRXOG 
temporarily reduce interest in low-carbon emission technologies such as CCS. In retrospect,  
(Broderick et al. 2011) envisaged that £32billion investment in shale gas has the potential to 
displace 12GW and 21GW of offshore and onshore wind capacity, respectively. The economics 
RI WKH µSDWK WR  DQG ¶ GHFDUERQLVDWLRQ IUDPHZRUNV DUH illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 
where the level of investment for each low-carbon technology from 2015 to 2030 is displayed. 
To achieve the 50gCO2/KWh by 2030, a £200billion capital investment in low-carbon generation 
is required for the electricity sector (Committee on Climate Change 2013a; Ofgem 2010). Large 
scale investment in wind and nuclear is dominant in all three scenarios with Sustainable50 
recording £72.3billion in offshore wind compared to £70.8billion and £47.4billion in Shale 
Gas50 and Shale Gas100, respectively, (see Fig.13 and 14). Both scenarios have identical 
installed nuclear capacity amounting to £33.2billion. Onshore wind investments are high in 
Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50, that is £24.1billion and £24.2billion compared to £15.3billion in 
Shale Gas100.  
 Fossil fuel and biomass generation fitted with CCS could cost about £19.9 billion in 
Sustainable50, £17.8billion in Shale Gas50 while £12.1billion could be invested in Shale 
Gas100. However, it is important to note that CCS is yet unproven at a large scale and the level 
of deployment to 2030 is still uncertain. The investment proportion for the other technologies in 
all the three scenarios are shown in Fig.13. The government believes that this investment could 
be attracted through the implementation of the Feed-in Tariff with Contracts for Difference (FiT 
CFD), offering stabilized returns for investors in the form of strike prices (Department of Energy 
& Climate Change 2012c). Therefore, this mechanism has the benefit of providing greater long-
term certainty to low carbon investors.   
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Figure 13: Low-carbon investment for pathways 2015 - 2030 
  
The inclusion of shale gas in the generation mix could play a vital role in substituting 
imported gas to meet demand for gas fired generation for system balancing, (Committee on 
Climate Change 2013a). However, the increased JRYHUQPHQW¶V enthusiasm for shale gas 
development, coincides with the low-carbon investment drive targeting the 15% EU renewable 
energy target by 2020 (HM Government 2009) and the 80% emission reduction target by 2050. 
As a result, the level of investment for the decarbonisation pathways shown in Fig.14 could be 
affected as resources are diverted towards the development of shale gas (Schrag 2012). The shale 
gas industry acknowledges that significant quantities of shale gas are not likely to be produced 
until around 2025 by which time our commitments on climate change would not permit it to be 
combusted in any significant quantities (Anderson and Broderick 2014). At the backdrop of our 
strong climate change policies, the case for low-carbon investment is absolute. Sustainable50 and 
Shale Gas50 low-carbon portfolios to 2030 would require a total of £202.5billion and 
£197.4billion, respectively, while the Shale Gas100 would require £151.8billion to meet the 
decarbonisation trajectories outlined in Table 1.2 for the transition pathways. The investment 
portfolio for Shale Gas100 is lower compared to the other two scenarios but its overall emission 
SHUIRUPDQFHFRXOGFRPSURPLVHRQWKH8.¶V contribution to reduce emission in line with the 2oC 
global carbon budget and the domestic budget.   
  
 
Figure 14: Total low-carbon investment outlay to 2030 
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Conclusions  
This paper has explored the implications of including shale gas in UK electricity generation mix 
in the context of the decarbonisation policy discourse. This analysis employed three scenarios; 
Sustainable50 and Shale Gas50 seeking to achieve a 50g/kWh carbon grid intensity by 2030 
using conventional gas and shale gas in the generation mix, respectively. Shale Gas100 follows 
WKH µSDWKWRJ¶WDUJHWLQJWRPHHWJ&22/kWh carbon grid with shale gas employed in the 
generation portfolio. The impact of shale gas use on the UK electricity sector is measured in the 
context of the 2030 decarbonisation milestone, investment and penetration of renewable 
technologies. 
Under the 50g/kWh carbon grid trajectory, unabated shale gas has a very limited role in the 
generation mix unless used in conjunction with CCS applications. The results suggest that the 
inclusion of shale gas under the deep emissions cuts will not diminish the requirement for low-
carbon technologies to develop a zero carbon electricity sector by 2050. Under this abatement 
framework, Sustainable50 has a total of 96.1GW of renewable capacity by 2030 while the Shale 
Gas50 has 93.8GW of renewable capacity. The difference in installed renewable capacities in the 
two scenarios is a result of the increased generation from unabated shale gas in Shale Gas50 (8% 
compared to 6%) prompted by the 30% fuel cost reduction and lesser emission factor applied to 
shale gas. As a result, the level of investment in low carbon technologies in Shale Gas50 is in the 
order of £197.4billion compared to £202.5billion in Sustainable50 where unabated conventional 
gas has a very limited role in the generation mix. The penetration of low carbon technologies 
especially CCS is limited during this period as it is still at the early stages of commercialisation 
while new nuclear deployment is constrained by investment issues.   
 The benefits of shale gas can potentially be realized in the event of a 100g/kWh carbon grid 
intensity being adopted. The relatively higher emission trajectory characterising this pathway 
limits the penetration of low-carbon technologies. Unabated shale gas generation accounts for 
21% (88TWh) of total generation resulting in 74.7GW and 15.7GW renewable and low-carbon 
installed capacity by 2030, respectively. This is almost 4% less than the renewable technology 
penetration realised through implementation of the 50gCO2/kWh abatement framework. This 
pathway has the benefit of reduced investment capacity in low-carbon technologies in the order 
of £151.8billion compared to RYHUELOOLRQIRUWKHRWKHUWZRVFHQDULRV$OWKRXJKWKHµSDWKWR
J¶LVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHWDUJHWE\WKHGDQJHU is that it is likely to put enormous 
pressure on other sectors of the economy to decarbonise. Shale gas use under this abatement 
OHYHO ULVNV WKH 8.¶V JOREDO FRPPLWPHQW WR PDNH D IDLU FRQWULEXWLRQ WR DYRLGLQJ D oC rise in 
global temperatures (Anderson and Broderick 2014).   
Despite the mounting calls for the electricity sector to be decarbonized by 2030, UK 
government has not yet provided a clear margin by which the sector should decarbonise. 
Therefore, developments in shale gas under WKH µSDWK WR  J¶ have a greater potential to 
LQFUHDVHWKHFXPXODWLYHHPLVVLRQVE\WKXVFRPSURPLVLQJRQWKHQDWLRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVWR
the global emission reduction. Since CCS is yet unproven at a large scale, developments in shale 
gas without a defined abatement framework will make the electricity sector decarbonisation 
agenda extremely difficult to achieve.  
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